On the Theory/Practice Divide: Indivar Jonnalagadda

A Constant Dilemma of Life in TISS

The debate regarding the relative importance of theory and practice is an everyday feature of life at TISS. Intuitively, we all see that theory and practice have a reciprocal influence. Almost nobody would deny that both are important and we need some sort of synthesis of the two. But that's easier said than done! Taking the particular context of development theory and practice, one is presented with an elaborate division of labour. The normative principles are being provided by the high ethical philosophy of the West, the working principles by more proximate think-tanks,while implementation is in the hands of an army of foot-soldiers consisting of locals and social workers. A whole industry of development has arisen, with students from institutes like TISS zealously lining up for a placement at some level or the other. But besides this, there are also other problems --- deeper questions about the relationship between representation (theory/knowledge) and reality. I wish to explore this relationship and also to reflect on certain possibilities for a reconstruction of the development discourse. I won't go about placing my thoughts very systematically, but I'll try to convey them in a simpler way by presenting certain fragments from my readings and my experiences in “the field”.

Heidegger's Silence/Arendt's Laughter

Martin Heidegger was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century and also one of the most controversial for his allegiance with the Nazis. Heidegger lived for two decades after the war but never spoke out in self-defence or self-reproach. It was Hannah Arendt, another great 20th century philosopher (and incidentally, Heidegger's ex-lover) who spoke out.

Arendt refers to a tale from the time of birth of Western philosophy: a tale of Thales, the so-called first-philosopher. The story goes --- one day as Thales was strolling with his eyes on the stars he fell into a ditch. There happened to be a girl along the wayside who laughed and reproached Thales. What is the point of his knowledge of the stars if he can't see what lies below his feet? Arendt recasts herself as the laughing girl and Heidegger as the fallen philosopher.

She identifies Heidegger's flaw as retreating too far into vita contempletiva (the contemplative life) which is harmfully absent-minded and judges from such a great distance that it dissociates from vita activa (the life of action in concert with others). She points out that viewed from such a distance “one inevitably sees the people as a rabble to be controlled by one form or other of authoritarianism, rather than a human plurality to be participated in and celebrated.” She calls the purely contemplative life a “living death.”

Image source:
http://stickyembraces.tumblr.com/post/30515672947/the-adventures-of-marx-and-engels-22

Hegel Upside Down

Now let's rewind one century further back to another pair of grand philosophers: Hegel and Marx.

Hegel's philosophy is astoundingly systematic and had an unparalleled influence in early 19th century Germany. Hegel propounded a ground-breaking theory of development which saw history as the process of the development of ideas, where ideas progressed dialectically, i.e. new ideas emerged out of a synthesis of prevalent ideas and their contradictions (thesis and antithesis).

A young Marx found himself surrounded by Hegelians. His relation with Hegel's thought was mixed. He admired Hegel's historical thinking and his dialectic, but loathed his privileging of ideas over material reality. At that time, there were two factions of Hegelians, the Old and the Young. The Old Hegelians believed philosophy could by itself bring about social change while the Young Hegelians believed that only radical actions could bring about a social change. Marx, however, believed them all to be misled since in his view Hegel's dialectic was flawed. In his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right Marx makes the 2 following statements:

1. “(The Old Hegelians) tried to make philosophy a reality without first abolishing it”

2. “(The Young Hegelians) tried to abolish philosophy without first making it a reality.”

In dialectical thought the word “abolish” has a particular meaning. To put it very simplistically, to abolish refers to the act of rejecting while preserving certain elements. Hegel would preserve the rational elements while Marx would preserve the revolutionary/progressive elements. Returning to the above statements, they indicate that Marx believed representation(knowledge) and reality to be dialectically related. Their synthesis then is the basis of our practices and for Marx it is only through a commitment to practice that desirable social change can be brought about. I tend to agree at some level, but with certain reservations that I shall elaborate on.

The importance of Marx's contribution cannot be understated. I think even today when the theory/practice distinction is invoked we are somewhere referring to the problematic as framed by Young Marx in the early 19th century. But surely Young Marx's ideas can also be “abolished”. For instance, his idea that representation and reality are dialectically related. We cannot count on a single determining factor for their synthesis, it is multiply-determined if not overdetermined. So, if as Marx says, practice is the synthesis of knowledge and reality, then I find myself with a great deal of doubt and scepticism everytime I act. In this respect, the words of the German romantics Novalis and Schlegel in their critique of Hegel come to mind: “It is equally fatal to the spirit to have a system and not to have a system. It will simply have to combine the two.”

Although I am no fan of romanticism, their critique is compelling. While the dialectic can be immensely useful in identifying large patterns, it misses out on other things, what Novalis and Schlegel would call “fragments”. Thus, I think that we cannot be satisfied with broad structural understandings, but such an understanding must also be accompanied by knowledge from the fragment, the particular, the deviant, the random. Or to be less vague, there is no doubt that social phenomena are emergent, i.e. although we might understand the constituents of a system, this understanding would not help us understand the phenomena that result out of their interaction. For example, we might have a comprehensive understanding of the behaviour of various nation states, but that does not help us arrive at a satisfactory understanding of international relations. For that, we would require new concepts and new theories. Social phenomena at every level are emergent. It is valuable to understand every level and resist the tendency or desire to privilege a particular level. I hope that the reader can see where I'm going with this. If not, I believe the next couple of fragments will help to clarify. In part 2 of this article I will present to you some observations from an internship experience.

Indivar is a second year student of the MA in Development Studies Programme at TISS, Mumbai. Part II of this article can be read here.